The Israel–Palestine conflict has reshaped borders, displaced families and repeatedly disrupted everyday life across generations. Its history includes competing national aspirations, wars, occupation, failed negotiations and profound inequalities in security and freedom. These charts follow that history into its human consequences: deaths, damaged homes, interrupted healthcare and the enduring refugee question. They also examine how people abroad and governments at the United Nations have responded. Each figure belongs to a particular place, period and definition. Reading those details together helps explain both the scale of suffering and why a lasting political settlement remains so difficult for the communities directly affected.
A historical overview, not a live situation dashboard. Most humanitarian comparisons use 2024 observations; damage and international polling use dated 2025 assessments. Historical series have their own cutoffs. Figures from different sources are not combined into a single current total.
Statistics
- The events that shaped the conflict
- How territorial arrangements changed
- Israeli settlement population growth
- Palestinian and Israeli deaths over time
- The age and sex profile of verified fatalities
- Displacement and the loss of home
- The geography of destruction in Gaza
- Gaza’s changing hospital capacity
- Where registered Palestine refugees are recorded
- How international public opinion differs
- How countries voted at the United Nations
- Human impact and living conditions
1. The events that shaped the conflict
Selected milestones, 1947–2023
The timeline shows how temporary arrangements became lasting features of everyday life. The 1949 armistices ended one phase of fighting without resolving Palestinian displacement. The 1967 war introduced an occupation that later negotiations did not end. Oslo created institutions and divided responsibilities, but postponed the hardest questions: borders, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees and security. Subsequent violence weakened trust in negotiations, while the division between Gaza and the West Bank complicated Palestinian representation. The events of October 2023 brought another devastating rupture. Understanding these layers helps explain why a ceasefire, although essential to stopping immediate harm, does not by itself settle the underlying political conflict.
Select an event or focus a marker for context. Milestones are selective, not a complete chronology. Sources: UN historical timeline and history of the question of Palestine.
Sources: UN historical timeline · UN history.
2. How territorial arrangements changed
1947 proposal and 1949 armistice · territories occupied in 1967 · Oslo areas shown in 2011
Fit map · use zoom buttons to inspect labels.
These maps describe successive political arrangements, rather than a single continuous measure of ownership. The proposed partition of 1947 differed substantially from the lines established after the 1948 war. The occupation beginning in 1967 brought the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli military control. Later, the Oslo process divided the West Bank into areas with different administrative and security responsibilities. The resulting geography helps explain why travel, construction and access to services became central political questions. A boundary on a map can separate neighbouring communities from workplaces, farmland or hospitals, even when the distance between them is short. Administrative fragmentation therefore has consequences far beyond diplomacy.
The first map overlays a proposal and armistice lines. The 1967-territories map was published in February 1978, before Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai. The Oslo map is a July 2011 snapshot, not current control. No map represents private land ownership. Original UN map disclaimers are retained.
Sources: Original UN maps · OCHA Oslo areas.
3. Israeli settlement population growth
Selected observations, 1990–2021 · PCBS compilation of Israeli statistical sources
The settlement population outside Jerusalem J1 increased more than fivefold between 1990 and 2021, while the Jerusalem J1 population rose more slowly. Growth continued through the period of the Oslo negotiations and afterwards, making the geography facing negotiators increasingly different from the one they inherited. Population growth reflects births and migration, alongside the availability of housing and the policies that permit construction and infrastructure. The figures do not separate those contributions. Their political importance lies in the increasing number of residents, roads and built areas involved in any future agreement. Population totals alone, however, do not measure how much land settlements occupy or control.
Jerusalem J1 is the part of Jerusalem governorate annexed by Israel after 1967, as defined by PCBS. Series end in 2021; these are historical benchmarks, not current totals. Intermediate annual values are not invented.
Sources: PCBS settlement population, 1986–2021.

Everyday geography
A concrete wall can make a political boundary tangible in everyday life. This photograph near Jerusalem, taken in 2010, records one section of the West Bank barrier rather than its entire route. For people living nearby, routes to work, education, healthcare and family members can become part of the experience of conflict. The historical maps provide the wider context in which this infrastructure sits. They show how different kinds of lines and administrative areas overlap. A photograph cannot measure those effects on its own, but it reminds us that the geography discussed in negotiations is also the setting of ordinary daily routines.
Antoine Taveneaux, September 2010 · CC BY-SA 3.0; unmodified.
4. Palestinian and Israeli deaths over time
OCHA verified historical records, 2008–2022 · later reported war totals shown separately
Gaza: at least 45,541 Palestinians reported killed through 30 December 2024 (Gaza Ministry of Health, via OCHA). Israelis and foreign nationals: more than 1,593 reported killed through 31 December 2024 (Israeli military and official sources cited by OCHA), including 393 soldiers killed in Gaza or along the border since the ground operation began. These are cumulative reported totals, not annual verified observations.
Deaths rose sharply during major escalations rather than following a smooth trend. The largest historical peak shown here is 2014, when intense fighting in Gaza produced a much higher Palestinian death toll; Israeli deaths also increased. Smaller annual totals between major wars did not mean an absence of violence, insecurity or bereavement. The later reported Gaza-war figures mark a dramatic increase in the scale of loss, while the October 2023 attacks caused mass deaths in Israel. These records cover different periods and circumstances. They describe people killed, including civilians and combatants, and cannot by themselves establish responsibility or the legality of individual incidents.
Historical data cover direct conflict-related confrontations in the occupied Palestinian territory and Israel, following OCHA’s inclusion and verification rules. All of 2023 is omitted to avoid presenting a partial year as complete. Later reported totals are not appended as annual observations.
Sources: OCHA casualty database · OCHA situation update 251.
5. The age and sex profile of verified fatalities
Gaza · 8,119 fatalities verified by OHCHR by 2 September 2024
Children account for a large share of the deaths in this verified subset, while both women and men also suffered substantial losses. The pattern points to the destruction of households and communities, rather than harm confined to people participating in fighting. OHCHR linked the high number of deaths in individual attacks to the use of weapons with wide effects in densely populated areas. Its verified cases were concentrated in residential buildings, partly because those incidents could be documented more readily. This is therefore a description of the records verified at that point, not a representative sample from which to estimate the composition of every death in Gaza.
Published OHCHR figures: 1,865 boys, 1,723 girls, 2,036 women; adult men are the arithmetic remainder (2,495) of 8,119 verified deaths. Unknown age/sex is not separately reported for this subset. Unverified deaths are outside its denominator. Age and sex do not determine civilian or combatant status.
Sources: OHCHR six-month report, page 6 · OHCHR findings, 8 November 2024.
6. Displacement and the loss of home
Selected observations · each panel has its own scope, dates and scale
Gaza — estimated people displaced
Israel — people still displaced at year end
West Bank — newly displaced by settler violence / access restrictions
Displacement affects more than the place where someone sleeps. Leaving home can interrupt schooling, employment, medical treatment and the family networks that provide practical support. In Gaza, the reported scale expanded rapidly after October 2023, with many people forced to move repeatedly. Israel also experienced large-scale evacuation, although the number still displaced fell between the end of 2023 and the end of 2024. The West Bank panel captures a narrower pattern: people leaving amid settler violence and access restrictions. These experiences have different causes and magnitudes, but all show why returning home requires more than permission to move: safety, shelter and functioning services must also be restored.
Gaza and Israel panels show estimates of people displaced at dated observations. The West Bank panel shows annual newly displaced people due specifically to settler violence/access restrictions, not all causes and not a year-end stock. Do not sum panels or interpret repeated movements as additional unique people. Gaza October and November figures are approximate lower bounds. Dashed segments only connect dated observations; they do not estimate intervening values. Dashed segments only connect dated observations; they do not estimate intervening values.
Sources: OCHA statement, 10 October 2023 · WHO, 10 November 2023 · IDMC GRID 2025 · OCHA West Bank displacement.
7. The geography of destruction in Gaza
UNOSAT assessment · imagery dated 11 October 2025
Fit map · use zoom buttons to inspect labels.
The damage map shows destruction distributed across Gaza, with dense concentrations in areas where homes and services previously stood close together. UNOSAT assessed roughly four in five structures as affected by October 2025, and classified most affected structures as destroyed. Such widespread damage means recovery cannot be reduced to replacing individual buildings. Neighbourhoods also need roads, water networks, electricity, schools and medical care before families can rebuild their lives. The assessment recorded further deterioration in Gaza and North Gaza compared with July. These geographical patterns help explain repeated displacement and the difficulty of finding usable shelter, even when people are able to return to their former neighbourhoods.
Preliminary satellite assessment, not field-validated. 198,273 affected structures: 123,464 destroyed, 17,116 severely damaged, 33,857 moderately damaged and 23,836 possibly damaged. Structures are not the same as housing units. This is an October 2025 assessment, not a live map.
Sources: UNOSAT product 4213.
8. Gaza’s changing hospital capacity
Five dated snapshots during 2024 · the same baseline of 36 hospitals
Only a minority of Gaza’s original hospitals were functioning at these dates, and those still operating were classified as partially functional. Limited recoveries in the count therefore did not amount to a return to normal care. Hospitals need reliable electricity, clean water, medicines, specialist staff and safe routes for patients as well as intact buildings. Fighting, damage, evacuation and supply restrictions can interrupt any of those requirements. The consequences extend beyond injuries from violence: childbirth, cancer treatment, dialysis and routine emergencies also depend on access to care. A hospital reopening with restricted services can save lives while still leaving large parts of the population’s medical needs unmet.
Original 36-hospital denominator; field hospitals excluded. Partial functionality does not specify the share of beds or services available. Zero fully functional hospitals at the displayed dates. Five observations do not describe every intervening change.
Sources: WHO/OCHA, 3 January 2024 · WHO, 2 May 2024 · WHO, July 2024 · WHO, 12 September 2024 · OCHA, 31 December 2024.
9. Where registered Palestine refugees are recorded
UNRWA registrations · 31 December 2024
Jordan accounts for the largest share of UNRWA’s registered Palestine refugees, followed by Gaza. The distribution reflects the lasting consequences of earlier displacement and the growth of refugee families across generations. Registration is different from residence in a refugee camp: many registered refugees live outside camps, and legal rights differ across host countries and territories. Nor does this chart count only people displaced by the current war. Someone already registered with UNRWA may have been displaced again, sometimes repeatedly. The figures show why the refugee question is regional as well as local, involving education, healthcare, livelihoods, citizenship and unresolved claims about return and compensation.
UNRWA in Action, June 2025: 5,914,407 registered Palestine refugees across five fields, data as of 31 December 2024. Registrations are not a census of people currently present, a camp population, or a count of recent displacement.
Sources: UNRWA in Action, June 2025.

Where governments register their positions
The General Assembly chamber is a setting in which governments publicly state their positions and vote on resolutions. Each member state has one vote, regardless of its population or economic size. The resulting record can reveal coalitions, persistent disagreements and changes between particular texts. It cannot capture every negotiation that took place before a vote, or explain all the reasons behind an abstention. This photograph, taken in 2011, shows the institutional setting rather than any of the votes analysed here. The matrix below connects that setting to specific decisions, allowing the wording and date of each resolution to remain part of the comparison.
Basil D Soufi, 23 April 2011 · CC BY-SA 3.0; unmodified.
10. How international public opinion differs
Pew Research Center · spring 2025 · opinion of Israel, 24 countries outside Israel
Unfavourable views of Israel were more common than favourable views in most countries surveyed, but the pattern was not uniform. Nigeria and Kenya stood out for more positive opinion, while India had a particularly large share of respondents who did not express a view. Historical relationships, domestic politics, religion and perceptions of the war may all shape these differences; this question does not identify their individual effects. It also asks about Israel, not separately about Israeli people, its government or a specific policy. The results help describe the international climate in which governments make decisions, while reminding us that public opinion and official foreign policy need not move together.
Q3g, opinion of Israel. Published combined favourable/unfavourable totals are used; don’t know/refused appears in tooltips and the data file. Rounding means totals may differ from 100%. National sampling and interview modes differ. Countries are ordered by unfavourable share, not by population.
Sources: Pew Research Center, spring 2025 topline · Pew analysis and methodology.
11. How countries voted at the United Nations
Twenty selected member states · three General Assembly resolutions, 2023–2024
The voting pattern reveals both durable positions and changes between resolutions. Some governments supported all three texts, while Israel and the United States opposed each of them. Australia, India and Japan moved from abstaining on the October 2023 truce resolution to supporting the December ceasefire resolution. Argentina followed a different path across the three votes. Those changes should be read alongside the texts: a call for a humanitarian truce and a resolution concerning Palestine’s membership application ask different questions. Votes can reflect alliances, domestic priorities and objections to particular wording. A large General Assembly majority expresses diplomatic support, but does not itself ensure that decisions are implemented.
Sample chosen to include several regions and contrasting voting patterns, not a global ranking. “No vote” does not identify the reason. October 2023 uses the printed adoption record (120 yes, 14 no, 45 abstentions); later corrected UN database totals may differ. Palestine was not a voting UN member in these roll calls.
Sources: UN adoption record, ES-10/21 · UN adoption record, ES-10/22 · UN adoption record, ES-10/23.
12. Human impact and living conditions
Selected table 1 · historical reference figures with individual reporting dates
12 indicators
| Reported deaths | Gaza | 45,541 | 7 Oct 2023–30 Dec 2024 | Gaza MoH, via OCHA | Cumulative reported fatalities; not independently verified OCHA database entries. | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported injuries | Gaza | 108,338 | 7 Oct 2023–30 Dec 2024 | Gaza MoH, via OCHA | Cumulative reported injuries; not a disability estimate. | Source |
| Reported deaths | Israelis / foreign nationals | More than 1,593 | 7 Oct 2023–31 Dec 2024 | Israeli military / official sources, via OCHA | Includes 393 soldiers killed since the Gaza ground operation began; scope differs from the Gaza MoH count. | Source |
| Soldiers reported injured | Gaza ground operation | 2,521 | Through 31 Dec 2024 | Israeli military, via OCHA | Since the beginning of the ground operation; not all Israeli injuries. | Source |
| People internally displaced | Gaza | Approximately 1.9 million | 31 Dec 2024 snapshot | OCHA / humanitarian partners | People, not the sum of repeated movements. | Source |
| People still displaced | Israel | 68,000 | End of 2024 | IDMC GRID 2025 | Conflict-related year-end stock; down from 200,000 at end-2023. | Source |
| Newly displaced people | West Bank | 1,539 | Calendar year 2023 | OCHA | Specifically settler violence/access restrictions; not all causes of displacement. | Source |
| Partially functional hospitals | Gaza | 17 of 36 | 31 Dec 2024 | Health Cluster / WHO, via OCHA | Original hospital network; field hospitals excluded. No fully functional hospitals. | Source |
| Functional primary care centres | Gaza | 52 of 138 | 31 Dec 2024 snapshot | Health Cluster, via OCHA | 6 fully and 46 partially functional. | Source |
| Water produced and supplied | Gaza | 102,000 m³/day | 21–27 Dec 2024 average | WASH Cluster, via OCHA | Before substantial network losses; not household water consumption. | Source |
| Affected structures | Gaza | 198,273 | 11 Oct 2025 imagery | UNOSAT | Destroyed, severely/moderately/possibly damaged structures; preliminary satellite assessment. | Source |
| Registered Palestine refugees | Five UNRWA fields | 5,914,407 | 31 Dec 2024 | UNRWA | Registration population; distinct from current displacement. | Source |
The indicators describe a crisis that reaches beyond the immediate death toll. Displacement increases the need for shelter and basic services at the same time that damaged infrastructure reduces the ability to provide them. Injuries create sustained demands for treatment, rehabilitation and care within families. Water losses and interrupted healthcare can compound those pressures long after the incident that caused the initial damage. Each row therefore records its own period and population. The table is a reference for the dimensions of harm, rather than a set of figures that can be added together or treated as a simultaneous measure of conditions today.
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Sources and image credits
Sources and dates are provided below each chart and in the table. The pack includes the plotted aggregate values, definitions and the original selection mapping. Historical observations are retained as dated comparisons and are not presented as current conditions.
Banner: Forced Displacement of Gaza Strip Residents During the Gaza-Israel War 23–25, Jaber Jehad Badwan, 29 January 2025; CC BY-SA 4.0; unmodified original. Body photographs are credited beside each image. Maps reproduce UN/OCHA/UNOSAT publications, retaining their legends, disclaimers and source credits.
