Palestinians moving through damaged surroundings in Gaza, photographed by Jaber Jehad Badwan on 29 January 2025

Israel–Palestine conflict

The Israel–Palestine conflict has reshaped borders, displaced families and repeatedly disrupted everyday life across generations. Its history includes competing national aspirations, wars, occupation, failed negotiations and profound inequalities in security and freedom. These charts follow that history into its human consequences: deaths, damaged homes, interrupted healthcare and the enduring refugee question. They also examine how people abroad and governments at the United Nations have responded. Each figure belongs to a particular place, period and definition. Reading those details together helps explain both the scale of suffering and why a lasting political settlement remains so difficult for the communities directly affected.

A historical overview, not a live situation dashboard. Most humanitarian comparisons use 2024 observations; damage and international polling use dated 2025 assessments. Historical series have their own cutoffs. Figures from different sources are not combined into a single current total.

1. The events that shaped the conflict

Selected milestones, 1947–2023

29 November 1947: UN General Assembly resolution 181 proposed separate Arab and Jewish states and an international regime for Jerusalem. The proposed arrangement was not implemented.1947Partition proposalUN proposal for two states and an international regime for Jerusalem.Israel declared independence in May 1948. War involving neighbouring Arab states followed; hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled or were expelled. Palestinians commemorate this dispossession as the Nakba.1948War and displacementIsrael’s independence, war and mass Palestinian displacement.Armistice agreements established the Green Line. Jordan controlled the West Bank and Egypt administered Gaza; these lines differed from the 1947 proposal.1949Armistice linesThe Green Line differs from the earlier partition proposal.In the June war, Israel occupied the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza, alongside Sinai and the Golan Heights. The territorial and political consequences endured.1967Occupation beginsIsrael occupies the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, Sinai and Golan.The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel provided for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. It did not resolve Palestinian statehood or the occupation of Palestinian territory.1979Egypt–Israel peacePeace treaty provides for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.A Palestinian uprising began in the occupied territory. Mass protest, strikes and confrontations brought renewed international attention to the occupation.1987First IntifadaPalestinian uprising brings renewed attention to the occupation.Israel and the PLO exchanged recognition and signed the Declaration of Principles. The process established interim self-government while deferring borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements and security.1993Oslo processMutual recognition and interim self-government; final issues deferred.The interim agreement divided the West Bank into Areas A, B and C with different civil and security arrangements. These were not the borders of a sovereign Palestinian state.1995Oslo IIAreas A, B and C have different civil and security arrangements.Renewed large-scale violence followed the breakdown of peace efforts. Attacks on Israeli civilians and Israeli military operations caused heavy losses and deepened mistrust.2000Second IntifadaRenewed violence follows the breakdown of peace efforts.Israel removed its settlers and permanent ground forces from Gaza. Control of access, the population registry and other aspects of life remained central disputes.2005Gaza disengagementIsraeli settlers and permanent ground forces leave Gaza.Hamas took control in Gaza while the Palestinian Authority remained in parts of the West Bank. Israel tightened the blockade; Egypt also restricted its border crossing.2007Palestinian political splitHamas controls Gaza; the Palestinian Authority remains in parts of the West Bank.Hamas-led attacks killed people in Israel and took hostages. Israel launched a major military campaign in Gaza, followed by extensive deaths, displacement and destruction.20237 October and war in GazaHamas-led attacks and hostage-taking; Israel launches its Gaza campaign.Selected milestones · evenly spaced for reading, not proportional to elapsed time.
29 November 1947: UN General Assembly resolution 181 proposed separate Arab and Jewish states and an international regime for Jerusalem. The proposed arrangement was not implemented.

The timeline shows how temporary arrangements became lasting features of everyday life. The 1949 armistices ended one phase of fighting without resolving Palestinian displacement. The 1967 war introduced an occupation that later negotiations did not end. Oslo created institutions and divided responsibilities, but postponed the hardest questions: borders, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees and security. Subsequent violence weakened trust in negotiations, while the division between Gaza and the West Bank complicated Palestinian representation. The events of October 2023 brought another devastating rupture. Understanding these layers helps explain why a ceasefire, although essential to stopping immediate harm, does not by itself settle the underlying political conflict.

Select an event or focus a marker for context. Milestones are selective, not a complete chronology. Sources: UN historical timeline and history of the question of Palestine.

Sources: UN historical timeline · UN history.

2. How territorial arrangements changed

1947 proposal and 1949 armistice · territories occupied in 1967 · Oslo areas shown in 2011

1947 proposal / 1949 armistice. UN map 4153 (October 2000): proposed partition and the later armistice lines. The proposal was not implemented.
UN map 4153 (October 2000): proposed partition and the later armistice lines. The proposal was not implemented. Open original source

Fit map · use zoom buttons to inspect labels.

These maps describe successive political arrangements, rather than a single continuous measure of ownership. The proposed partition of 1947 differed substantially from the lines established after the 1948 war. The occupation beginning in 1967 brought the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli military control. Later, the Oslo process divided the West Bank into areas with different administrative and security responsibilities. The resulting geography helps explain why travel, construction and access to services became central political questions. A boundary on a map can separate neighbouring communities from workplaces, farmland or hospitals, even when the distance between them is short. Administrative fragmentation therefore has consequences far beyond diplomacy.

The first map overlays a proposal and armistice lines. The 1967-territories map was published in February 1978, before Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai. The Oslo map is a July 2011 snapshot, not current control. No map represents private land ownership. Original UN map disclaimers are retained.

Sources: Original UN maps · OCHA Oslo areas.

3. Israeli settlement population growth

Selected observations, 1990–2021 · PCBS compilation of Israeli statistical sources

The settlement population outside Jerusalem J1 increased more than fivefold between 1990 and 2021, while the Jerusalem J1 population rose more slowly. Growth continued through the period of the Oslo negotiations and afterwards, making the geography facing negotiators increasingly different from the one they inherited. Population growth reflects births and migration, alongside the availability of housing and the policies that permit construction and infrastructure. The figures do not separate those contributions. Their political importance lies in the increasing number of residents, roads and built areas involved in any future agreement. Population totals alone, however, do not measure how much land settlements occupy or control.

Jerusalem J1 is the part of Jerusalem governorate annexed by Israel after 1967, as defined by PCBS. Series end in 2021; these are historical benchmarks, not current totals. Intermediate annual values are not invented.

Sources: PCBS settlement population, 1986–2021.

Everyday geography

Everyday geography

A concrete wall can make a political boundary tangible in everyday life. This photograph near Jerusalem, taken in 2010, records one section of the West Bank barrier rather than its entire route. For people living nearby, routes to work, education, healthcare and family members can become part of the experience of conflict. The historical maps provide the wider context in which this infrastructure sits. They show how different kinds of lines and administrative areas overlap. A photograph cannot measure those effects on its own, but it reminds us that the geography discussed in negotiations is also the setting of ordinary daily routines.

Antoine Taveneaux, September 2010 · CC BY-SA 3.0; unmodified.

4. Palestinian and Israeli deaths over time

OCHA verified historical records, 2008–2022 · later reported war totals shown separately

Separate later reporting window: 7 October 2023 to late December 2024

Gaza: at least 45,541 Palestinians reported killed through 30 December 2024 (Gaza Ministry of Health, via OCHA). Israelis and foreign nationals: more than 1,593 reported killed through 31 December 2024 (Israeli military and official sources cited by OCHA), including 393 soldiers killed in Gaza or along the border since the ground operation began. These are cumulative reported totals, not annual verified observations.

Deaths rose sharply during major escalations rather than following a smooth trend. The largest historical peak shown here is 2014, when intense fighting in Gaza produced a much higher Palestinian death toll; Israeli deaths also increased. Smaller annual totals between major wars did not mean an absence of violence, insecurity or bereavement. The later reported Gaza-war figures mark a dramatic increase in the scale of loss, while the October 2023 attacks caused mass deaths in Israel. These records cover different periods and circumstances. They describe people killed, including civilians and combatants, and cannot by themselves establish responsibility or the legality of individual incidents.

Historical data cover direct conflict-related confrontations in the occupied Palestinian territory and Israel, following OCHA’s inclusion and verification rules. All of 2023 is omitted to avoid presenting a partial year as complete. Later reported totals are not appended as annual observations.

Sources: OCHA casualty database · OCHA situation update 251.

5. The age and sex profile of verified fatalities

Gaza · 8,119 fatalities verified by OHCHR by 2 September 2024

Children account for a large share of the deaths in this verified subset, while both women and men also suffered substantial losses. The pattern points to the destruction of households and communities, rather than harm confined to people participating in fighting. OHCHR linked the high number of deaths in individual attacks to the use of weapons with wide effects in densely populated areas. Its verified cases were concentrated in residential buildings, partly because those incidents could be documented more readily. This is therefore a description of the records verified at that point, not a representative sample from which to estimate the composition of every death in Gaza.

Published OHCHR figures: 1,865 boys, 1,723 girls, 2,036 women; adult men are the arithmetic remainder (2,495) of 8,119 verified deaths. Unknown age/sex is not separately reported for this subset. Unverified deaths are outside its denominator. Age and sex do not determine civilian or combatant status.

Sources: OHCHR six-month report, page 6 · OHCHR findings, 8 November 2024.

6. Displacement and the loss of home

Selected observations · each panel has its own scope, dates and scale

Gaza — estimated people displaced

Israel — people still displaced at year end

West Bank — newly displaced by settler violence / access restrictions

Displacement affects more than the place where someone sleeps. Leaving home can interrupt schooling, employment, medical treatment and the family networks that provide practical support. In Gaza, the reported scale expanded rapidly after October 2023, with many people forced to move repeatedly. Israel also experienced large-scale evacuation, although the number still displaced fell between the end of 2023 and the end of 2024. The West Bank panel captures a narrower pattern: people leaving amid settler violence and access restrictions. These experiences have different causes and magnitudes, but all show why returning home requires more than permission to move: safety, shelter and functioning services must also be restored.

Gaza and Israel panels show estimates of people displaced at dated observations. The West Bank panel shows annual newly displaced people due specifically to settler violence/access restrictions, not all causes and not a year-end stock. Do not sum panels or interpret repeated movements as additional unique people. Gaza October and November figures are approximate lower bounds. Dashed segments only connect dated observations; they do not estimate intervening values. Dashed segments only connect dated observations; they do not estimate intervening values.

Sources: OCHA statement, 10 October 2023 · WHO, 10 November 2023 · IDMC GRID 2025 · OCHA West Bank displacement.

7. The geography of destruction in Gaza

UNOSAT assessment · imagery dated 11 October 2025

Damage assessed 11 October 2025. UNOSAT Gaza Strip Comprehensive Damage Assessment, published 31 October 2025. Original map, legend and source credits retained.
UNOSAT Gaza Strip Comprehensive Damage Assessment, published 31 October 2025. Original map, legend and source credits retained. Open original source

Fit map · use zoom buttons to inspect labels.

The damage map shows destruction distributed across Gaza, with dense concentrations in areas where homes and services previously stood close together. UNOSAT assessed roughly four in five structures as affected by October 2025, and classified most affected structures as destroyed. Such widespread damage means recovery cannot be reduced to replacing individual buildings. Neighbourhoods also need roads, water networks, electricity, schools and medical care before families can rebuild their lives. The assessment recorded further deterioration in Gaza and North Gaza compared with July. These geographical patterns help explain repeated displacement and the difficulty of finding usable shelter, even when people are able to return to their former neighbourhoods.

Preliminary satellite assessment, not field-validated. 198,273 affected structures: 123,464 destroyed, 17,116 severely damaged, 33,857 moderately damaged and 23,836 possibly damaged. Structures are not the same as housing units. This is an October 2025 assessment, not a live map.

Sources: UNOSAT product 4213.

8. Gaza’s changing hospital capacity

Five dated snapshots during 2024 · the same baseline of 36 hospitals

Only a minority of Gaza’s original hospitals were functioning at these dates, and those still operating were classified as partially functional. Limited recoveries in the count therefore did not amount to a return to normal care. Hospitals need reliable electricity, clean water, medicines, specialist staff and safe routes for patients as well as intact buildings. Fighting, damage, evacuation and supply restrictions can interrupt any of those requirements. The consequences extend beyond injuries from violence: childbirth, cancer treatment, dialysis and routine emergencies also depend on access to care. A hospital reopening with restricted services can save lives while still leaving large parts of the population’s medical needs unmet.

Original 36-hospital denominator; field hospitals excluded. Partial functionality does not specify the share of beds or services available. Zero fully functional hospitals at the displayed dates. Five observations do not describe every intervening change.

Sources: WHO/OCHA, 3 January 2024 · WHO, 2 May 2024 · WHO, July 2024 · WHO, 12 September 2024 · OCHA, 31 December 2024.

9. Where registered Palestine refugees are recorded

UNRWA registrations · 31 December 2024

Jordan accounts for the largest share of UNRWA’s registered Palestine refugees, followed by Gaza. The distribution reflects the lasting consequences of earlier displacement and the growth of refugee families across generations. Registration is different from residence in a refugee camp: many registered refugees live outside camps, and legal rights differ across host countries and territories. Nor does this chart count only people displaced by the current war. Someone already registered with UNRWA may have been displaced again, sometimes repeatedly. The figures show why the refugee question is regional as well as local, involving education, healthcare, livelihoods, citizenship and unresolved claims about return and compensation.

UNRWA in Action, June 2025: 5,914,407 registered Palestine refugees across five fields, data as of 31 December 2024. Registrations are not a census of people currently present, a camp population, or a count of recent displacement.

Sources: UNRWA in Action, June 2025.

Where governments register their positions

Where governments register their positions

The General Assembly chamber is a setting in which governments publicly state their positions and vote on resolutions. Each member state has one vote, regardless of its population or economic size. The resulting record can reveal coalitions, persistent disagreements and changes between particular texts. It cannot capture every negotiation that took place before a vote, or explain all the reasons behind an abstention. This photograph, taken in 2011, shows the institutional setting rather than any of the votes analysed here. The matrix below connects that setting to specific decisions, allowing the wording and date of each resolution to remain part of the comparison.

Basil D Soufi, 23 April 2011 · CC BY-SA 3.0; unmodified.

10. How international public opinion differs

Pew Research Center · spring 2025 · opinion of Israel, 24 countries outside Israel

Unfavourable views of Israel were more common than favourable views in most countries surveyed, but the pattern was not uniform. Nigeria and Kenya stood out for more positive opinion, while India had a particularly large share of respondents who did not express a view. Historical relationships, domestic politics, religion and perceptions of the war may all shape these differences; this question does not identify their individual effects. It also asks about Israel, not separately about Israeli people, its government or a specific policy. The results help describe the international climate in which governments make decisions, while reminding us that public opinion and official foreign policy need not move together.

Q3g, opinion of Israel. Published combined favourable/unfavourable totals are used; don’t know/refused appears in tooltips and the data file. Rounding means totals may differ from 100%. National sampling and interview modes differ. Countries are ordered by unfavourable share, not by population.

Sources: Pew Research Center, spring 2025 topline · Pew analysis and methodology.

11. How countries voted at the United Nations

Twenty selected member states · three General Assembly resolutions, 2023–2024

ES-10/2127 Oct 2023ES-10/2212 Dec 2023ES-10/2310 May 2024ArgentinaArgentina: Yes on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.YesArgentina: Abstain on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.AbstainArgentina: No on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.NoAustraliaAustralia: Abstain on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.AbstainAustralia: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesAustralia: Yes on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.YesBrazilBrazil: Yes on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.YesBrazil: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesBrazil: Yes on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.YesCanadaCanada: Abstain on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.AbstainCanada: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesCanada: Abstain on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.AbstainChinaChina: Yes on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.YesChina: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesChina: Yes on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.YesEgyptEgypt: Yes on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.YesEgypt: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesEgypt: Yes on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.YesFranceFrance: Yes on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.YesFrance: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesFrance: Yes on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.YesGermanyGermany: Abstain on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.AbstainGermany: Abstain on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.AbstainGermany: Abstain on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.AbstainIndiaIndia: Abstain on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.AbstainIndia: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesIndia: Yes on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.YesIndonesiaIndonesia: Yes on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.YesIndonesia: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesIndonesia: Yes on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.YesIsraelIsrael: No on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.NoIsrael: No on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.NoIsrael: No on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.NoJapanJapan: Abstain on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.AbstainJapan: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesJapan: Yes on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.YesKenyaKenya: Yes on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.YesKenya: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesKenya: Yes on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.YesMexicoMexico: Yes on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.YesMexico: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesMexico: Yes on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.YesNigeriaNigeria: Yes on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.YesNigeria: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesNigeria: Yes on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.YesSouth AfricaSouth Africa: Yes on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.YesSouth Africa: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesSouth Africa: Yes on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.YesSpainSpain: Yes on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.YesSpain: Yes on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.YesSpain: Yes on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.YesUnited KingdomUnited Kingdom: Abstain on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.AbstainUnited Kingdom: Abstain on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.AbstainUnited Kingdom: Abstain on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.AbstainUnited StatesUnited States: No on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.NoUnited States: No on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.NoUnited States: No on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.NoVenezuelaVenezuela: No vote on ES-10/21, 27 Oct 2023 — Humanitarian truce.No voteVenezuela: No vote on ES-10/22, 12 Dec 2023 — Humanitarian ceasefire.No voteVenezuela: No vote on ES-10/23, 10 May 2024 — Palestine membership application / participation rights.No voteOctober: humanitarian truce · December: humanitarian ceasefireMay: Palestine membership application and participation rights
Select a country and resolution, or tap a vote for the subject and date.

The voting pattern reveals both durable positions and changes between resolutions. Some governments supported all three texts, while Israel and the United States opposed each of them. Australia, India and Japan moved from abstaining on the October 2023 truce resolution to supporting the December ceasefire resolution. Argentina followed a different path across the three votes. Those changes should be read alongside the texts: a call for a humanitarian truce and a resolution concerning Palestine’s membership application ask different questions. Votes can reflect alliances, domestic priorities and objections to particular wording. A large General Assembly majority expresses diplomatic support, but does not itself ensure that decisions are implemented.

Sample chosen to include several regions and contrasting voting patterns, not a global ranking. “No vote” does not identify the reason. October 2023 uses the printed adoption record (120 yes, 14 no, 45 abstentions); later corrected UN database totals may differ. Palestine was not a voting UN member in these roll calls.

Sources: UN adoption record, ES-10/21 · UN adoption record, ES-10/22 · UN adoption record, ES-10/23.

12. Human impact and living conditions

Selected table 1 · historical reference figures with individual reporting dates

12 indicators

Reported deathsGaza45,5417 Oct 2023–30 Dec 2024Gaza MoH, via OCHACumulative reported fatalities; not independently verified OCHA database entries.Source
Reported injuriesGaza108,3387 Oct 2023–30 Dec 2024Gaza MoH, via OCHACumulative reported injuries; not a disability estimate.Source
Reported deathsIsraelis / foreign nationalsMore than 1,5937 Oct 2023–31 Dec 2024Israeli military / official sources, via OCHAIncludes 393 soldiers killed since the Gaza ground operation began; scope differs from the Gaza MoH count.Source
Soldiers reported injuredGaza ground operation2,521Through 31 Dec 2024Israeli military, via OCHASince the beginning of the ground operation; not all Israeli injuries.Source
People internally displacedGazaApproximately 1.9 million31 Dec 2024 snapshotOCHA / humanitarian partnersPeople, not the sum of repeated movements.Source
People still displacedIsrael68,000End of 2024IDMC GRID 2025Conflict-related year-end stock; down from 200,000 at end-2023.Source
Newly displaced peopleWest Bank1,539Calendar year 2023OCHASpecifically settler violence/access restrictions; not all causes of displacement.Source
Partially functional hospitalsGaza17 of 3631 Dec 2024Health Cluster / WHO, via OCHAOriginal hospital network; field hospitals excluded. No fully functional hospitals.Source
Functional primary care centresGaza52 of 13831 Dec 2024 snapshotHealth Cluster, via OCHA6 fully and 46 partially functional.Source
Water produced and suppliedGaza102,000 m³/day21–27 Dec 2024 averageWASH Cluster, via OCHABefore substantial network losses; not household water consumption.Source
Affected structuresGaza198,27311 Oct 2025 imageryUNOSATDestroyed, severely/moderately/possibly damaged structures; preliminary satellite assessment.Source
Registered Palestine refugeesFive UNRWA fields5,914,40731 Dec 2024UNRWARegistration population; distinct from current displacement.Source

The indicators describe a crisis that reaches beyond the immediate death toll. Displacement increases the need for shelter and basic services at the same time that damaged infrastructure reduces the ability to provide them. Injuries create sustained demands for treatment, rehabilitation and care within families. Water losses and interrupted healthcare can compound those pressures long after the incident that caused the initial damage. Each row therefore records its own period and population. The table is a reference for the dimensions of harm, rather than a set of figures that can be added together or treated as a simultaneous measure of conditions today.

Russia–Ukraine war · Terrorism · European Union

Sources and dates are provided below each chart and in the table. The pack includes the plotted aggregate values, definitions and the original selection mapping. Historical observations are retained as dated comparisons and are not presented as current conditions.

Banner: Forced Displacement of Gaza Strip Residents During the Gaza-Israel War 23–25, Jaber Jehad Badwan, 29 January 2025; CC BY-SA 4.0; unmodified original. Body photographs are credited beside each image. Maps reproduce UN/OCHA/UNOSAT publications, retaining their legends, disclaimers and source credits.